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I. INTRODUCTION

Have you ever experienced an awkward prayer moment? Maybe
you're a teacher and your principal ended an impromptu prayer at a staff
meeting with "in Jesus's Name We Pray, Amen." Perhaps you've
attended a town banquet and the Mayor blessed the meal with a prayer to
"God the Father Almighty." In either hypothetical, if you, your coworker, or your dinner guest held a competing religious belief, would
you feel uncomfortable? If so, are the direct references to "Jesus" more
offensive to you than the passive references to God? Does it matter to
you that both the principal and the Mayor are government actors? If
you're having trouble answering, or distinguishing a "civil nicety"' from
something that feels more like preaching, you're not alone. Courts
vacillate on prayer issues all the time.2 But, since the second half of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court's trend has been to gradually limit
prayer in many familiar realms of public life,3 with one notable
4
exception, the legislature.
1. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 356 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., infra Part III.A & Part III.B (analyzing two competing circuit
approaches to one particular area of prayer policy, legislative prayers).
3. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(finding compulsory rendition of the pledge of allegiance in school setting
unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding teacher-led school
prayer unconstitutional); Abbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(holding school-sponsored Bible reading unconstitutional); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (holding a compulsory moment of silence at school unconstitutional).
4. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that a Nebraska legislature's practice of
employing a paid chaplain to deliver prayer before meeting was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause); see infra Part Ill (analyzing the circuit split post-Marsh).
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In Marsh v. Chambers, a majority of Supreme Court justices
found prayers given by a chaplain, in front of the Nebraska State
legislature, did not violate the Establishment Clause.5 At the time, the
Court characterized legislative prayer as a natural by-product of
Protestantism, and little more than "simply a tolerable acknowledgment
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country." 6 Today, the
religious paradigm is shifting and empirical data suggests that "the
United States is on the verge of becoming a minority Protestant
country."
Accordingly, as traditional presumptions about American
religion fade, Marsh continues to elicit controversy, largely because
tough questions about prayer policy in America remain unanswered by
the Supreme Court.
Legislative prayer is controversial for three reasons. First,
legislative prayer stands at the crossroads of three venerable First
Amendment doctrines: neutrality,8 free speech, 9 and government

5. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.
6. Id. at 792.
7. See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
SURVEY: RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC (Feb. 2008), available at
religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
The
U.S.
Religious Landscape Survey was conducted by the Pew Forum and surveyed over
35,000 Americans. Id. Pew reports there are major "shifts taking place in the U.S.
religious landscape." Id. The largest movement was recorded in those who identified
themselves as "unaffiliated." Id. Likewise, the Catholic Church reported the largest
net loss of membership. Id. These results bolster the existence of an increasingly
competitive marketplace for religion, one where the underlying rationale behind
Marsh may not still have traction. Id.
8. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (A state practice
must "neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion.").
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech."). Denial or censorship of a legislative prayer may offend a
person's otherwise valid free speech rights in a public forum. See Robert Luther III
& David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the "Prayer Police": Why the First

Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer and Demands A "Practice
Focused" Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569, 571-72 (2008) ("Legislative
bodies that refuse to allow those who are permitted to pray the right to mention
specific deities of their choosing-Jesus, Allah, Jehovah, or others-in their prayers
undermines diversity and the free speech rights of these individuals, and, in turn,
renders these traditionally solemn occasions meaningless.").
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speech.'o Second, Marsh only explicitly addressed prayer in state
legislatures, but its principles extend to "other deliberative bodies,""
such as municipalities. In 2014, the municipal setting is at the apex of the
legislative prayer debate, primarily because external variables, such as
the identity of the prayer-giver,12 the context of the prayer, and the
demographics of the community where prayer is offered, are most
stratified.13 Finally, Marsh remains the only Supreme Court case to ever
squarely address legislative prayer.14 As a corollary, interpretation has
fallen almost solely to lower courts, where it has received mixed results
since the Supreme Court's dicta in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,'5 a non-legislative prayer case that

interpreted a footnote in Marsh as drawing a distinction between
"sectarian" and "non-sectarian" legislative prayer, with the former being
10. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (holding
that the city's placement of donated monument in public park was "government
speech" and thus not subject to free speech constitutional scrutiny). Scholars have
argued that the Summum holding may have clear applications to the legislative
prayer issue. See Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh
and Sectarian Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017 (2011);
Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1019-21 (2010).
11. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
12. See Brett Harvey & Joel Oster, Who Said That? A Simple Question that
May Change the Way Courts View Legislative Prayer, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS 69, 69-74 (2013) (noting that a court's classification of a
prayer-giver as a private actor as opposed to a government one influences the
Establishment Clause outcome). Likewise, the scope of potential prayer givers
governed by the Marsh rule presents inherent problems. Cf Marsh, 463 U.S. 783
(paid Christian chaplain); Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006)
(volunteer clergy members from across Indiana); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376
F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (Wiccan); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870
P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) (Greek Orthodox Church, the Baha'i Faith, the Japanese
Church of Christ, the Church of Scientology, the Eckankar Faith, and others).
13. See Lund, supra note 10, at 1019-21 (describing how demographics can
serve as one element in determining the sectarian nature of a prayer); see also Brian
D. Lee, God Save the United States and This HonorableCourt: Navigating Through
the Marsh After Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011), 37 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 441, 463 (2013) (noting in his argument that "requiring legislative prayers to
be nonsectarian in order to pass constitutional muster fails to take into account the
religious demographics of the community in which the prayers are given").
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

UNANSWERED PRAYERS

2014]

629

prohibited and the latter being permissible.16 Since Allegheny, circuit
courts have disagreed on the proper application of the Marsh doctrine,17
and the appropriate role of the court, if any, in monitoring religious
speech in the legislative arena. Given the current split in authority,
some municipalities have adopted formal "neutral" prayer policies,
mirroring the language in Marsh,19 while others have continued to
operate without substantive guidelines or abandoned prayer at meetings
20
all together.
At the heart of the controversy are two sets of competing ethos
surrounding the usage of "sectarian" words in legislative prayer, which
author Noah Feldman terms "legal secularist" and "values
evangelicals."21 A sectarian prayer is a prayer that evokes "ideas or
images identified with a particular religion," 2 2 or "details upon which
men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ." 2 3 In the American JudeoChristian tradition, a familiar sectarian prayer is one that directly invokes

16. Id. at 602-20.
17. See infra Part Il.A & Part Ill.B (examining the legislative prayer circuit
split).
18. See Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding a
county's prayer practice and declining to "parse" the content of individual prayers at
issue); see also Robert Luther Ill & David B. Caddell, Breaking Away from the
"PrayerPolice". Why the First Amendment Permits Sectarian Legislative Prayer
and Demands A "PracticeFocused"Analysis, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 569 (2008)
(analyzing the mixed results among circuit court rulings since Marsh).
19. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied,

U.S.

_

_,

132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (neutral prayer policy struck down by

the Fourth Circuit); Rubin v. Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
_

U.S.

_,

134 S. Ct. 284 (2013) (neutral prayer policy upheld by the Ninth

Circuit).
20. See Joe Depriest & Adam Bell, Lawsuits Prompt Pausefor Some Sectarian
Prayers,CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
2013/08/05/4215342/lawsuits-prompt-pause-for-some.html#.Un OCZNetTF.
21. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 7-8 (2005). Sectarian prayer is
just one example of the wider disagreements these two belief systems hold on
religion in public life.
22. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
23. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Circuit court judges have weighed in as
well. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 364 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, a prayer
that references Jesus is sectarian.").
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the name of "Jesus Christ," 2 4 whereas a "non-sectarian" prayer is more
generic, composed with "inclusiveness and sensitivity" for other
religions, and usually just referencing "God" generally.25
"Legal secularists" believe sectarian prayers have no role in
26
contemporary public functions and use the Allegheny line of cases
following Marsh to prohibit colorful references to individual deities in
27
the legislature. In contrast, "values evangelicals" seek to promote
"traditional moral values that can in theory be shared by everyone," 2 8 and
use Marsh as a shield to validate direct, often vivid, and frequent
references to "Jesus Christ" in legislative prayers.29 Although the
legislative prayer issue is easily polarized by these competing belief
systems, in reality, "the line is not completely bright between sectarian
and non-sectarian" 3 0 and legislative prayer cases continue to be litigated.
Rowan County, North Carolina, is the latest battleground in the
culture war. 3 1 In March 2013, a Federal Judge in the Middle District
Court of North Carolina issued a preliminary injunction that barred
Rowan County Commissioners from giving "sectarian prayers" at county
meetings.3 2 Rather than acquiesce to the court order, Rowan County's
24. See Joyner, 353 F.3d at 364. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
25. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 581.
26. See FELDMAN, supra note 21 and accompanying text, at 8.
27. See infra Part III.A (highlighting opinions in the Fourth Circuit and the
Second Circuit that build off the majority opinion in Allegheny and mirror aspects of
the "legal secularist" point of view).
28. See FELDMAN, supra note 21 and accompanying text, at 7.

29. See id. One of the key commonalities within the "values evangelical" point
of view is "promoting a strong set of ideas about the best way to live one's life and
urging the government to adopt those values and encourage them wherever
possible." Id. Sectarian prayer is just one way a "values evangelical" may choose to
share his or her beliefs. See id. at 7-8. Since it is still unclear to what extent
sectarian prayers are allowable under Marsh, the "values evangelical" point of view
is naturally aligned with Marsh.
30. Pelphrey v. Cnty. of Cobb, 547 F.3d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008).
31. See infra Part IV (describing the on-going litigation revolving around
Rowan County's use of sectarian prayer at commission meetings); see also infra Part
V (analyzing the prayers given in Rowan County against the historical background
of the Establishment Clause).
32. See Memorandum Opinion And Order at 27-28, Lund v. Rowan County,
N.C.
No.
1:13-cv-00207-JAB-JLW
(July 23,
2013),
available at
https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/lund-et-al-v-rowan-county-memorandumopinion-and-order [hereinafter Memorandum Opinion].
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Commissioners openly engaged in a public campaign defying the
injunction. 33 The Commissioners' defiance first gained notoriety when
County Commissioner Jim Sides replaced his "usual American flag
necktie," for one "embellished with Jesus" before he recited the Lord's
34
Prayer at a subsequent county meeting. Reporters in attendance later
asked Commissioner Sides if he violated Rowan County's injunction.
Commissioner Sides replied, "(Beaty) said I couldn't use the name Jesus
in prayer . . . [h]e didn't say I couldn't preach." 3 6 Commissioner Sides
was also asked if he thought his prayer made anyone in the audience
"uncomfortable," 37 to which he responded, "I don't know they had the
opportunity to leave . . . [n]o one throwed [sic] any tomatoes."3 8

Meanwhile, the case received national attention when sympathetic North
Carolina legislators introduced the "Rowan County, North Carolina
Defense of Religion Act" in the North Carolina General Assembly,
seeking recognition that states were free to make laws establishing
religion.39 Then, in the fall of 2013, over one thousand protestors
convened outside of the Rowan County Courthouse to "Rally for
Rowan" 40 and protest the district court's preliminary injunction.
Reflecting the "values evangelical" point of view, Rowan
County's case identifies two critical First Amendment concerns: the

33. Nathan Hardin, Sides Delivers Lord's Prayer,Says It Doesn't Violate the
Injunction, SALISBURY POST (Aug.19, 2013), http://www.salisburypost.com
/article/20130819/SPO1/130819684.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. H.J. Res. 494, 2013-2014 Sess. (N.C. 2013). Although the bill received
national attention, it was not advanced beyond the N.C. House floor. See Jeremy
Markovich, The Defense of Religion Act Is Dead. Why Did It Exist?, WCNC.coM
CHARLOTTE (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.wcnc.com/news/politics/The-Defense-ofReligion-Act-Whats-fact-whats-fiction-201460571.html.
40. Mark Wineka, Large Crowd Converges on Salisbury to Support Rowan
County
Commissioners,
SALISBURY
POST
(Sept.
17,
2013),
http://www.salisburypost.com/article/20130917/SPO1/130919767. The local event
was entitled "Rally for Rowan" and was organized by Return America, Rowan
County's litigating attorney David Gibbs III, and Dr. Ron Baity. See September
Rally to Support Rowan Co. Prayer,North Carolina Family Policy Council (Sept. 5,
2013), http://ncfamily.org/stories/130905sl.html.
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current logistical problems elected officials must address if they choose
to facilitate a prayer opportunity under Marsh41 and the uncertainty
potential prayer-givers face when offering a legislative prayer. Neither
party enjoys clear awareness of their First Amendment rights and
obligations. And, without a resolution, both concerns may chill speech in
42
a constitutionally protected forum.
This term in Town of Greece v. Galloway,43 the Supreme Court
revisits legislative prayer, this time through the lens of local government,
to review the constitutionality of an informal prayer practice comparable
to the prayers at issue in Rowan County.44 This Note will explore the
current state of the Marsh doctrine, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Galloway. Part II recounts the history of the legislative prayer debate
in the United States, tracing the origins of the practice from the colonial
era through modern Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part III builds on this
framework to examine the current split in authority among circuit courts.
Part IV then outlines the factual narrative in Lund v. Rowan County45
Part V uses the facts in Lund to argue that, in the absence of more
concrete substantive guidelines from the Supreme Court to augment
Marsh, even overtly sectarian prayers like the ones at issue in Rowan

41. See generally Marc Rohr, Can the City Council Praise the Lord? Some
Ruminations About Prayers at Local Government Meetings, 36 NOVA L. REV. 481
(2012).
42. See Brief of Rev. Dr. Robert E. Palmer as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 15-17, Town of Greece v. Galloway,
U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2388 (2013)
(No.12-696), availableat http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads
/2013/01/Palmer-Amicus-Brief-12-696.pdf. Arguably, the Supreme Court's inaction
has already had a chilling effect on municipal speech in North Carolina. See Depriest
& Adam Bell, supra note 20; see also infra note 185 (describing how some North
Carolina municipalities have abandoned prayer programs because of uncertainties in
policy).
43. _ U.S. _,
133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013).
44. America's demographics have changed greatly since Marsh was resolved
in 1983. Perhaps our perceptions on legislative prayer have followed suit. See
Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237,
1239 (1986) (demonstrating how the tolerance of sectarian prayer in a contemporary
presidential address would have a different reception today than a century ago:
"[t]oday's American public . .. is far less homogeneous than the American public of
Lincoln's time, and many would feel uncomfortable with a contemporary
Presidential address as laden with biblical rhetoric and ideas as was Lincoln's").
45. See infra Parts IV & V.
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County are still permissible under a deferential reading of Marsh and its
progeny.
II. THE "UNIQUE" HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE UNITED
STATES

A. A BrieffHistory of the Establishment Clause

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."46 For the first half of United States history, this principle was
foreclosed to direct application among the states.47 However, once the
First Amendment became applicable to the states
through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down many stateendorsed religious customs on Establishment Clause grounds,49 which in
turn significantly expanded the doctrine.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Establishment Clause
was understood to mean, "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government"
could "set up a church" or "pass laws which aid one religion .

.

. all

religions, or prefer one religion over another., 50 This interpretation was
reflected in Lemon v. Kurtzman, when the Supreme Court addressed the
52
constitutionality of direct aid in the parochial school setting. There, the
Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to evaluate Establishment
Clause challenges. Under the Lemon test, to survive constitutional
scrutiny a state's policy: (1) "must have a secular legislative purpose;"
(2) "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion;" and (3) the policy "must not foster 'an excessive

46. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
47. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("[T]he
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.") (internal citation omitted);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause provisions to the states).
48. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
50. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. Id. at 612-13.
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government entanglement with religion.""' Thereafter, the Lemon test
became the hallmark inquiry for Establishment Clause challenges in the
United States.54
Still, no one test has completely dominated the Establishment
55
56
Clause field. In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Supreme Court described its
unwillingness "to be confined to any single test or criterion" in the
57
46
sensitive" area
of Establishment Clause challenges.
Although a
majority of the Court in Lynch upheld a city's erection of a nativity scene
58
under Lemon, Justice O'Connor's concurrence articulated an alternative
test. In O'Connor's view, the crux of an Establishment Clause inquiry
should simply ask whether the government's action endorsed a particular
religion.60 The so-called "endorsement test"61 collapses the first two
prongs of Lemon into a more fundamental inquiry that judges the intent
62
of the actor and the actual message conveyed to its audience. Under the
"endorsement test," a government actor violates the Establishment
Clause if the purpose or effect of his or her message approves or
63
disapproves of a religion. This standard is often measured by whether a
"reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and context"6 of a
government action would perceive there to be an endorsement of
53. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
54. See George R. Kennedy, God(s) in Congress: A Two-Step Analysis
Addressing the Constitutionality of Guest-Chaplain Invocations, and A Call for
Aggressive Enforcement of the Establishment Clause, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1731, 1736

(2013).
55. The majority in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), cited three
instances where the Court declined a Lemon test analysis to resolve an Establishment
Clause challenge. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1986); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).

56. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
57. Id. at 669.
58. Id. at 668.
59. Id. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

60. Id at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. See generally ALAN BROWNSTEIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (2007); Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status
and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499 (2002) (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
in the application of the "endorsement test").
62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

63. Id.
64. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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religion. As Part II.B shows, the Supreme Court has never applied the
Lemon or endorsement tests to legislative prayer challenges.
B. The Marsh Doctrine
A legislative prayer is an invocation that is designed to "invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws." 65
History supports that the Founding Fathers of the United States, the very
men who drafted the Establishment Clause, debated the issue and
resolved that prayers delivered before an elected body did not generate a
66
constitutional issue. Thus, the tradition of both sectarian and nonsectarian legislative prayer has persisted in the United States Congress,
67
as well as a majority of state legislatures, into the twenty-first century.
1. Marsh v. Chambers
History aside, a legislative prayer necessarily requires a religious
act and a government proxy, exactly the type of "entanglement" that
,68
Lemon was designed to prohibit. Recognizing that, "[s]tanding alone,
historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of

65. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)

66. See id. at 786-92 (analyzing the historical record of legislative prayer in
Congress). See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE AND ORIGINAL
INTENT 263-326 (2010) (providing a historical overview of early American
relationship between religion and government, describing the importance of original
intent, and articulating how to incorporate original intent into modern constitutional
practice); see also First Prayer of the Continental Congress, 1774, available at
http://chaplain.house.gov/archive/continental.html (memorializing Reverend Jacob
Duche's delivery of a prayer to the members of the First Continental Congress, a
prayer that included overtly Judeo-Christian themes).
67. See Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 7-24, Town of Greece v. Galloway, _ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2388 (2013)
(No.12-696), availableat http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013
/01/Greece-Members-of-Congress-Amicus.pdf (analyzing empirical data on the
history, substance, and practice of sectarian prayer in the United States Congress);
see also Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1172 (2009) (recounting the historical chaplaincies in the
legislature from the First Continental Congress through the Marsh era).
68. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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constitutional guarantees,"6 the Supreme Court granted certiorar in
Marsh v. Chambers to analyze the conflict and determine whether a two
hundred year old Nebraska practice of opening legislative sessions with a
prayer violated the Establishment Clause.70 In Marsh, the state of
Nebraska employed a Presbyterian minister as a paid chaplain to open
legislative sessions with an invocation of prayer. ' The chaplain's
prayers spanned over a sixteen-year period and included both sectarian
and non-sectarian references to Christian theology.72 The district court
and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test
and found that Nebraska's use of state funds to employ the chaplaincy
violated the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court reversed both lower courts and declined to
apply the Lemon test, relying instead on the original intent of the
Founding Fathers74 and the "unambiguous and unbroken" 5 historical
record of legislative prayer "deeply embedded in the history and tradition
of this country."76 Building on this "unique history,"77 the Marsh Court
departed from the Lemon analysis and, instead, articulated a different
"historical" standard to judge legislative prayers:
The content of the prayer is not of concern to
judges where . . . there is no indication that the
prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief. That being so, it is not for us

69. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 784-85
72. See id at 783-84.
73. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785-86.
74. Id. at 790-91 ("It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of
the First Congress voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also
voted to approve the draft of the First Amendment for submission to the states, they
intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just
declared acceptable.").
75. Id. at 792.
76. Id. at 786.
77. Id at 791.
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to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the
78
content of a particular prayer.
Therefore, Marsh stands for two clear propositions. First, based
on the historical record of legislative prayer in the United States, prayers
given in front of a legislature are permissible, unless the prayer
opportunity (or more specifically the forum for the prayer) was used to
"proselytize," "advance," or "disparage" one religion over another.79
Second, unless the "prayer opportunity" has been exploited, it is not the
role of the court to "parse" the words embedded in individual prayers
offered at legislative gatherings.so At the same time, Marsh also left
many practical questions unanswered.
Under Marsh, as a threshold matter, a court must first determine
if the prayer opportunity is exploited. If it is, then a court is free to parse
the content of prayers and assess any potential Establishment Clause
violations. But, if the prayer opportunity is not exploited, parsing is
prohibited. Herein lies the problem: How can a judge critically examine
whether a prayer "proselytizes" or determine when prayers invoking
deities like Jesus Christ, Allah, or Buddha begin to "advance or
"disparage" other religions, without first parsing the content? This
ambiguity leads to two imperfect outcomes.
On one hand, a court could infer from Marsh that a close
scrutiny of the factual record, including the content of the prayers, is a
necessary first step to ascertain whether the prayer opportunity was
exploited. But, under this approach the court also runs the risk of adding
its own meaning to the prayers, taking words out of context, and
arguably parsing the content in the process. On the other hand, a court
could also read Marsh literally, and if the prayer opportunity was
facilitated reasonably, arguably a court could conclude it has nothing left
to review. This approach, while easier to facilitate, would allow a larger
cross-section of prayer, likely dominated by the prevailing religious
viewpoint of the region. Marsh provided very little guidance to

78. Id. at 794-95.
79. Id.

80. Id.
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determine the correct approach. As such, the holding has been widely
debated at the circuit court level.
Notwithstanding circuit court analysis, Marsh is recognized as
the Supreme Court's narrow exception to general Establishment Clause
82
principles and endures as both the alpha and the omega of legislative
83
However, the Supreme Court has since
prayer jurisprudence.
collaterally invoked Marsh's historical analysis in the resolution of two
closely related Establishment Clause challenges involving religious
symbolism and ceremonial deism at the beginning of the 1990s. Read
together, the Court's opinions have raised questions about the scope of
Marsh.

2. County ofAllegheny v. ACL U, GreaterPittsburghChapter
In Allegheny, the Supreme Court addressed whether a town's
placement of a creche and a menorah on the front steps of the county's
courthouse during the winter holiday season violated the Establishment
Clause.84 Unlike Lynch, where the majority employed the Lemon test, the
Allegheny majority employed Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" and
held that under the totality of circumstances, clearly Christian and Jewish
themed symbols placed on a prominent public building with the express
visual consent of the mayor had the effect of endorsing religion.ss Justice
Kennedy's dissent validated the creche, in part, by harmonizing the
historical value in the town's display with the historical value the Marsh
Court found in legislative prayer.

81. See infra Part Ill.
82. See Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 281
(4th Cir. 2005) ("Marsh, in short, has made legislative prayer a field of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence with its own set of boundaries and guidelines.").
But see Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Marsh is not an exception to the
Establishment Clause).
83. See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty., N.C. v. Joyner, 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, _

U.S. _,,

132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).

84. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573-77.

85. See id. at 574.
86. See id. at 662-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Yet, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, found Justice
87
Kennedy's reliance on Marsh inapplicable. Justice Blackmun reasoned
that, notwithstanding historical merit, if the prayers at issue in Marsh
would have "[had] the effect of affiliating the government with any one
specific faith or belief," they too would have been unconstitutional.8 The
Allegheny Court noted that this was not an issue in Marsh because the
Chaplain "removed all references to Christ" after commencement of
litigation. 89 This commentary has led many circuit courts to view the
inclusion of sectarian references in prayer with great suspicion.90
3. Lee v. Weisman

The applicability of Marsh was also the subject of critique in Lee
v. Weisman,91 where the Supreme Court was again asked to judge the
permissiveness of public prayers under the Establishment Clause; this
time at a public high school graduation ceremony.92 In Lee, the principal
of a local New York primary school invited a local rabbi to give the
graduating class a pre-approved, non-sectarian prayer that reflected the
"American civil religion." 9 3 There, the majority held that prayers in the
graduation setting were distinguishable from the legislative setting and
violated the Establishment Clause in two ways.94
First, prayers offered in front of elected bodies were presumed to
reach mainly adults capable of rationalizing the prayer, whereas prayers
disseminated at a graduation ceremony would be heard by children and
the "coercive" effect of the prayer outweighed any tangible benefits.95

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 603 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.
505 U.S. 577 (1992).

92. Id. at 577.
93. Id. at 581. The principal in Lee instructed Rabbi Gutterman to read a
pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," which recommended all prayers
be composed with "inclusiveness and sensitivity." Id.
94. Id. at 580-99.
95. Id. For a general look at the nature and history of "civil religion" in the
United States, see ROBERT N. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A
POST-TRADITIONAL WORLD (1970); Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1239 (1986).
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Secondly, and more broadly, the majority held that the principal, a
government actor, violated the Establishment Clause when he attempted
to alter the rabbi's prayer even though his motives were benevolent.
The Lee Court reasoned that to allow a government actor to censor an
individual's prayers would give the government the power to steer the
religious message, thus establishing a "civic religion." 97
After thirty years, Marsh is still the guiding principle to resolve
legislative prayer challenges, but it must also be viewed in context with
other competing doctrines. Lynch, Allegheny, and their progeny offer an
attractive "endorsement test" alternative to Marsh's purely historical
analysis. Similarly, Lee's "coercion test" prohibited the government from
censoring prayer in the graduation setting, but it is unclear to what extent
this principle is analogous to the legislative prayer setting, where the
audience is composed almost entirely of adults. Thus, as Part III outlines,
circuit courts applying Marsh to legislative prayer challenges remain
divided.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT (1998-2013)
The Supreme Court's peripheral analysis of Marsh in Allegheny
and Lee has provided fodder for divisive circuit court decisions.98 Since
Marsh, five circuits have issued appellate opinions interpreting Marsh.9 9
To facilitate discussion, I have placed these circuits into two broad
categories that highlight their disparate approaches: (1) a "policy in

96. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-89. The majority held "it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id. at 589.
97. Id.
98. See Lund, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also infra Parts II.A.
& IlI.B.

99. The Second, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all issued
influential appellate opinions directly addressing the Establishment Clause issues in
legislative prayer. The Seventh Circuit addressed prayer in the state legislative
context in Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006), but the case was
remanded back to district court and subsequently dropped. The Sixth Circuit has also
recently upheld a facial challenge to an inclusive prayer policy in Jones v. Hamilton
County Gov., Tenn., No. 12-6079, 2013 WL 3766656 (6th Cir. July 19, 2013). The
court rendered no binding opinion on the as-applied challenge because the policy
had only been instituted for two months at the onset of the court's disposition.
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practice,,1oo approach, and (2) a "deferential" approach. The "policy in
practice" approach is a useful descriptor for the interpretation of the
Fourth Circuit and the Second Circuit. Those jurisdictions place
significant weight on not only the policy's language, but also the
frequency of sectarian prayers and whether the policy's implementation
tends to favor one religious viewpoint. The "policy in practice"
jurisdictions have been criticized for "parsing" words, phrases, and
religious themes from contested prayers.
In contrast, those
jurisdictions that have adopted a deferential approach, specifically the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, give more deference to Marsh and generally
apply less scrutiny to the individual words, phrases, and religious themes
in a contested prayer, especially if they are part of a codified, neutral
prayer policy.
A. "Policy in Practice"Approach
1. Fourth Circuit
By far the largest outgrowth of circuit court analysis on
legislative prayer is located in the Fourth Circuit. Since 2004, the Fourth
Circuit has issued four appellate opinions weighing in on sectarian
legislative prayer.102 However, to fully understand the "policy in
practice" approach, it must first be contrasted to Snyder v. Murray City
Corp.,to3 one of the earliest circuit court cases to interpret Marsh arising
out of the Tenth Circuit. In Snyder, a local citizen petitioned his city
council for approval to offer a prayer at a forthcoming council
100. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013). The
plaintiff's complaint coined the term "policy in practice." Id.
101. See Forsyth Cnty. v. Joyner, 653 F.3d 341, 355-67 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Niemeyer J., dissenting), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
102. Id; Turner v. City Council of City of Fredericksburg, V.A. 534 F.3d 352
(2008); Simpson v. Chesterfield Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.
2005); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
103. 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Wynne Court distinguished
its holding from Snyder largely based on semantics. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301, n.6
("[W]e find ... the Snyder Court unpersuasive, and inconsistent with the plain
language of Marsh."). Similarly, the Simpson Court noted the "lack of guidance"
provided by the Supreme Court in Marsh and deferred to its own interpretation, as
opposed to that of another circuit. Simpson, 404 F.3d at 281.

642

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

meeting. 10 4 Murray City denied Snyder's request because of a previous
public statement where Snyder made clear his prayer would address the
misguided nature of prayer in public, and advocate for a stronger
separation of church and state.105 The Tenth Circuit validated the city's
decision, holding that legislative prayers were sui generis,1os and should
only be disturbed if the prayer-giver uses the opportunity to "proselytize"
or disparage another religion. o7 Unlike later Fourth Circuit cases,
Snyder's interpretation of Marsh collapsed the word "advance" into the
"disparge[ment]" prong of Marsh and defined "proselytize" to mean
someone "that aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or .
108
derogates another religious faith or doctrine."
Six years later, the Fourth Circuit's first legislative prayer
opinion, Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, o0 distinguished its rationale
from Snyder and harmonized its findings with an expansive
interpretation of Allegheny, generating a circuit split. In Wynne, a
Wiccan plaintiff alleged that a town council's repeated direct invocations
of "Jesus Christ" were sectarian prayers that exceeded the allowances of
0 The Wynne Court
Marsh and violated the Establishment Clause.o'

104. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1228.
105. Id. at 1230.
106. Id at 1232. The majority found great significance in the Supreme Court's
derogation of the Lemon test in Marsh and its deliberate attempts not to extend the
historical analysis into other Establishment Clause realms. See id. Therefore, the
Snyder Court resolved that legislative prayer had achieved a "generic form" that
would in many instances allow prayers to survive facial challenges. See id.
107. Id. at 1233-34. Snyder also prohibited the selection of a prayer if it
stemmed from an "impermissible motive." Id. at 1234. Here, the city's denial of
Snyder's prayer did not derive from an impermissible motive because the evidence
demonstrated that the City of Murray knew Snyder would use the platform to
perpetuate prayers that were properly excluded under the "proselytize" prong of

Marsh.
108. Id. at 1234.
109. 376 F.3d 292 (2004).
110. Wynne, 376 F.3d at 294-95. The court drew a distinction between a
prayer given consistent with the "Judeo-Christian" tradition and the prayers offered
at town council meetings. Id at 299-300. A "Judeo-Christian" prayer has elements
that are common to both Jewish and Christian faiths. Id. Here, the town council's
references to Jesus Christ invoked "a deity in whose divinity only those of the
Christian faith believe." Id at 300 (emphasis in original). The former prayers were
consistent with Marsh and the latter violated Marsh. Id
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unanimously agreed with the plaintiff and struck down the Great Falls
practice.
The Wynne holding has two significant implications to the
development of the "policy in practice" approach. First, Wynne read the
dicta in Allegheny as adding a significant new layer of gloss onto
Marsh.112 In the court's view, Allegheny refined Marsh's approach, albeit
outside of the legislative prayer context, to mean: "[G]overnment may
not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a
preference for Christianity over other religions)." 1 l 3 Thus, the Wynne
Court used Allegheny's dicta to conclude that sectarian prayer, invoked
in a local government setting, "exploited a prayer opportunity" and
established the requisite government preference for a particular religion
described in Allegheny.1 14 Second, Wynne dispensed with Snyder and
interpreted "advance" to mean "'forward, further, [or] promote' the
belief"and "proselytize" to mean "'convert' others to that belief.""
Moreover, the court found that "advance" and "proselytize" were not
inclusive." Rather, they "have different meanings and denote different
activities,"ll 7 each sufficient to trigger Establishment Clause liability
under Marsh.
Thus, Wynne's disjunctive interpretation means that
mere advancement of religion alone can violate Marsh, generating a very
low standard for appellate judges to dismiss questionable legislative
prayers.

111. See id. at 299.
112. Id. at 298-300.
113. Id. at 297 (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989)) (emphasis omitted).

114. Id. at 298-300.
115. Id. at 300 (alteration in original).

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Here, the court noted that the Marsh test is disjunctive, and therefore,
a violation of either prong would render the prayer unconstitutional. Id. The
disjunctive nature of the Marsh test was questioned in Snyder v. Murray City Corp.,
159 F.3d 1227 (1998). The question of usage was also recently brought up by Justice
Kennedy during oral argument for Galloway, where he asked the plaintiffs counsel
to clarify the proposed narrowing of the Marsh test by treating "the word 'advance'
only as modified by 'proselytize'?". Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Town of
Greece v. Galloway, _ U.S. _,
133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL
5939896, at *27.
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A year later, the Fourth Circuit added to Wynne, this time by
affirming a local municipality's prayer policy in Simpson v. Chesterfield
County Board of Supervisors.'"9 In Simpson, the Board of Supervisors for
the County of Chesterfield, Virginia, adopted a formal prayer policy
tailored to comply with Marsh, stating that "invocation[s] must be nonsectarian with elements of the American civil religion and must not be
used to proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or to disparage any
other faith or belief." 20 In administrating the policy, Chesterfield
County solicited local clerics from a diverse pool of religious faiths to
perform non-sectarian invocations at county meetings,121 although the
vast majority of churches who responded were Christian.' 22
Simpson, who was also a Wiccan, petitioned the County Board
to perform a Wiccan prayer at a county meeting or, in the alternative, to
remove all prayer from county meetings.123 The county declined to
include the Wiccan prayer, reasoning that a divinity "invoked by
practitioners of witchcraft," was likely not within the "non-sectarian"
requirement of the policy.124 Simpson disagreed and brought suit alleging
an Establishment Clause violation.125 The Simpson Court sided with
Chesterfield County, validating the prayer policy, as well as its decision
to exclude the Wiccan prayer.126 But, Simpson is still in line with
Wynne's disfavor of sectarian prayer. Although the Chesterfield County
Board had originally tolerated prayers referencing "Jesus," the county
later amended its policy to prohibit all direct references to "Jesus" to
avoid "the slightest hint of sectarianism." 27 Therefore, the court found
that since the policy "strived for inclusiveness," and reflected a

119. 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 278 (quoting the Chesterfield Board's prayer policy mandate that
an "invocation must be non-sectarian with elements of the American civil religion
and must not be used to proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or to disparage
any other faith or belief").

121. Id at 279.
122. Id at 278.
123. Id. at 279-80.
124. Id. at 280.
125. Id
126. Id. at 287 ("We cannot adopt a view of the tradition of legislative prayer
that chops up American citizens on public occasions into representatives of one sect
and one sect only, whether Christian, Jewish, or Wiccan.").
127. Id at 279.
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commitment to a "non-sectarian" ideal-something the defendants in
Wynne lacked 28--Chesterfield County's policy was also permissible.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's first two legislative prayer cases laid
the foundation for the "policy in practice" approach. Wynne flatly
prohibits a local government from offering strictly Christian prayers to
the exclusion of others because to do so advances one religion over
another.129 At the same time, Simpson gives deference to prayers offered
as part of a diverse, non-sectarian prayer policy. 130 Taken together, these
cases left open the possibility that sectarian prayers, disseminated
through a neutral prayer policy aimed at diversity, would still pass
constitutional muster in the Fourth Circuit.
However, seven years after Simpson, a majority of the Fourth
Circuit struck down Forsyth County's neutral prayer policy in Joyner v.
Forsyth County,13 1 holding that it too had the effect of advancing the
Christian faith. 13 The Forsyth City Board of Commissioners solicited
prayer-givers from diverse religions within the jurisdiction to offer
invocations at official meetings.133 Prayer-givers acted as private citizens
and the Board played no role in censoring the content of the prayer.134
Like Wynne, many of the prayers given at Board meetings were
sectarian. Unlike Wynne, no religion was excluded, and the policy was
more neutral than the policy upheld in Simpson.136 Nevertheless, a
128. Id. Furthermore, the court seemed to infer that a presence of diversity
afforded the Board more discretion to select among many competing faiths and
reduce potential divisiveness flowing from a controversial prayer at its meeting. See
id. at 284-85.
129. See Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301-02.
130. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287-89.
131. 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011).
132. Id. at 349.
133. Id. at 343. The Board selected clergy members for invocations informally
until 2007 when it codified its earlier practice into an official policy. Id. at 343-44.
134. Id. at 343.
135. Id. at 343-44.
136. In Joyner, the Forsyth County Board solicited religious invocations from
religious leaders in and out of the community using the "yellow pages, internet
research, and consultation with the local Chamber of Commerce." Id. Likewise,
"[n]o eligible congregation was excluded," and to encourage diversity "the Board
decided not to schedule any leader for consecutive meetings or for more than two
meetings in any calendar year." Id. Although the Chesterfield County Board's policy
mimicked Joyner's, a distinction can still be made. In Simpson, prayers were
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majority of the court held that a facially neutral policy, which operated to
give a reasonable impression of affiliation with one religion, was still
inconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Marsh.'37 In so
holding, the majority dismissed the dissent's assertion that their review
of the prayer policy at issue constituted "parsing" of prayer content.138
Rather, the majority believed Marsh interpreted the First Amendment to
require more and to "shut our eyes to patterns of sectarian prayer" would
leave the court "without an ability to decide the case." 3 9 Likewise, the
court weighed in on the identity of the prayer-giver, holding that the
classification of a prayer-giver as a public or private actor was of little
constitutional significance because "[i]t was the governmental setting for
the delivery of sectarian prayers that courted constitutional difficulty, not
those who actually gave the invocation." 40 Therefore, even if the prayergiver is a government actor, like the Rowan County Commissioners in
Lund, this fact is not dispositive in determining whether the prayer
opportunity was abusive.
Judge Paul Niemeyer's dissent in Joyner found the majority's
rationale misplaced, holding that "the Establishment Clause does not
require that Forsyth County censor and restrict legislative prayers as the
majority mandates."' 4 1 As a threshold matter, Judge Niemeyer found the
fact that Forsyth County instituted a neutral policy demonstrated that the

solicited using just, "the telephone book" and there was no provision to rotate
prayer-givers. See Simpson, 404 F.3d at 278.
137. The majority elaborated on the form of a constitutional prayer:
It should not reject the tenets of other faiths in favor of just
one. Infrequent references to specific deities, standing
alone, do not suffice to make out a constitutional case. But
legislative prayers that go further-prayers in a particular
venue that repeatedly suggest the government has put its
weight behind a particular faith-transgress the boundaries
of the Establishment Clause. Faith is as deeply important as
it is deeply personal, and the government should not appear
to suggest that some faiths have it wrong and others got it
right.
Id. at 349.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 351.
Id.
Id. at 350.
Joyner, 653 F.3d at 358 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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prayer opportunity had not been exploited.142 And, as a corollary, without
exploitation of the prayer opportunity itself, a court could not "parse" out
143
the content of the prayers. As an example, Judge Niemeyer pointed to
the majority's reliance on one particularly damaging sectarian prayer in
the record given by a local minister.144 The prayer at issue made a
number of references to specific tenets of the Christian faith, such as the
"Cross of Calvary," "Virgin Birth," and the "Gospel of Jesus Christ."145
This close scrutiny of individual prayers, Judge Niemeyer explained,
"simply because of its description of Jesus' role in Christianity," was
"precisely the content-inquiry that Marsh intended to foreclose." 46
Moreover, such an exercise rendered the purpose of the prayer
opportunity meaningless.147 This task, he believed, was "best left to
theologians, not courts of law."1 4 8
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit's recent appellate opinion in Galloway v.
Town of Greece1 4 9 muddies the Marsh analysis. Unlike the facially
neutral policy in Joyner, Town of Greece addressed an un-codified local
prayer tradition, where the town solicited a broad array of prayer-givers
from different faiths within the municipality.150 However, in practice, the
142. Id. at 356, 362 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Forsyth County did not exploit
the prayer opportunity to advance any one religion over others.").
143. Id. at 364--65 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 361 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 349 (majority opinion).
146. Id. at 361 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 356 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority's
reduction of prayer "treats prayer agnostically; reduces it to civil nicety; [and] hardly
accommodates the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Marsh").
148. Id. at 365 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The dissent's
argument was dismissed by the majority because it would "inevitably favor the
majoritarian faith in the community at the expense of religious minorities living
therein." Id. at 354. Scholar Christopher C. Lund elaborates on the lack of a political
remedy and the demographic reality that is inescapable in predominately Christian
jurisdictions. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of
Religious Endorsements, supra note 10, 1011-12; see also infra Part V.C..
149. 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
U.S. _,
133 S. Ct. 2388
(2013).
150. See id. at 23-24.
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citizenry was predominately Christian, and the majority of prayers
disseminated at town meetings were sectarian."' The district court
awarded summary judgment to the town, citing the plaintiff s inability to
demonstrate how the town improperly excluded minority religious
faiths.152 The Second Circuit appellate court reversed, holding "that the
town's prayer practice must be viewed as an endorsement of a particular
religious viewpoint." 53
The recent Second Circuit holding may be at odds with the
"policy in practice," approach. On one hand, the court's use of the word
"endorsement" rather than "advancement" in the opinion, without
announcing any formal acceptance of the "endorsement test" doctrine,
only an ambiguous reliance on "legal judgment,"l54 could indicate
doctrinal tension. Moreover, it could signal the Second Circuit's
abandonment from the historical analysis in Marsh all together. On the
other hand, perhaps Town of Greece can still be reconciled with Marsh
and the "policy in practice" approach.
Notwithstanding the nomenclature, both of the "policy in
practice" circuits still interpret the text of Marsh similarly. Although the
Fourth Circuit considers improper prayer "advancement" and the Second
Circuit considers it "endorsement," the legislative prayer result still
seems to be the same. Both circuits observe the prayer practice as a
whole and conduct a case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiry into the prayers
offered and the context in which they are disseminated. Both circuits also
read Allegheny's prohibition on "sectarian" prayer broadly, placing a
premium on the "frequency" of those prayers. It also seems that the
Second Circuit has adopted the Fourth Circuit Joyner majority, deemphasizing the demographic factors of a community where prayers are
given.155 In any event, the holding in Town of Greece raises serious
doubts about the future application of Marsh.

151. Id at 24.

152. Id. at 25.
153. Id at 30.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id "In our view, whether a town's prayer-selection process constitutes an
establishment of religion depends on the extent to which the selection process results
in a perspective that is substantially neutral amongst creeds." Id at 31.
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B. "Deferential"Approach
In the Eleventh and Ninth circuits, Marsh receives a much
different treatment. The crux of Snyder's majority and Joyner's dissent
have resonated in recent legislative prayer opinions in the Eleventh and
Ninth Circuits, who have upheld facially neutral prayer policies without
a sensitive parsing of their substantive content. 156
1. Eleventh Circuit
Deference was instrumental in the development of the Eleventh
Circuit's initial interpretation of Marsh in Pelphrey v. Cobb County.15 7 In
Pelphrey, the plaintiffs relied on Allegheny to argue that Marsh broadly
prohibited sectarian prayer.
The appellate court conducted an initial
inquiry into the prayer opportunity afforded by Cobb County, rather than
addressing the substance of the prayer, and found no exploitation.15 9
Although the court acknowledged that Marsh did not prohibit sectarian
prayer, the court "decline[d] [the] role of 'ecclesiastical arbiter,"'l60 and
refused to parse the content of individual prayers, believing that "the line
is not completely bright between sectarian and nonsectarian.""'6 The
approach in Pelphrey was recently re-affirmed in Atheists ofFlorida,Inc.
v. City of Lakeland,162 where the Eleventh Circuit was again confronted
with a facially neutral prayer policy challenge. The result was the same,

156. See Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.

denied beforejudgment, 2013 WL 3789507 (Oct. 2013); Atheists of Florida, Inc. v.
City of Lakeland, 713 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2013); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d
1263 (11th Cir. 2008).
157. 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008).
158. Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1270-72.

159. See id. at 1270-73.
160. Id. at 1274. The court noted not only its own judicial incompetency for
prayer determinations ("We would not know where to begin to demarcate the
boundary between sectarian and nonsectarian expressions"), but also the "opaque"
standards offered by the plaintiffs. Id. For instance, the court noted the plaintiffs
response to whether "King of Kings," was sectarian, "King of kings may be a tough
one .

. .

. It is arguably a reference to one God .

it might not be sectarian." Id.
161. Id. at 1272.
162. 713 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 2013).

. .

. I think it is safe to conclude that
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eroding doubts that Pelphrey, decided prior to Joyner, was not
distinguishable from the controlling law in the Fourth Circuit.163
2. Ninth Circuit
Perhaps most combative to the "policy in practice" approach is
the recent opinion in Rubin v. City of Lancaster,164 where the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the City of Lancaster's prayer policy on
facial and "as applied" challenges.16 In Rubin, the City of Lancaster
executed a neutral, diversely inclusive prayer policy that solicited
volunteer prayer-givers for its meetings,166 similar to plans struck down
in the Fourth Circuitl67 and upheld in the Eleventh Circuit.i1s However,
in practice many of the volunteers were Christian, and many of the
prayers directly invoked the name of Jesus.169 Building on the legacy of
Marsh, and the lessons of Joyner and Pelphrey, the court found that a
neutral prayer policy simply did not exploit the prayer opportunity under
Marsh.170 Similar to the Pelphrey court, Rubin held that since the prayers
in Marsh themselves were, in many cases, "explicitly Christian," Marsh
could not be read to preclude sectarian Christian references.

163. In Pelphrey, the majority stated: "the Fourth Circuit read Marsh as we do,
to allow a county to invite clergy from diverse faiths to offer 'a wide variety of
prayers' at meetings of its governing body." Pelphrey, 713 F.3d at 1273. However,
this statement was made in reliance on Simpson not Joyner. Atheist's ofFlorida,Inc.
confirms that the two circuits do indeed have conflicting approaches. See Atheist's
of Florida, Inc., 713 F.3d 577, 590-91 (2013) (upholding the decision in Pelphrey
and applying the Pelphrey test to resolve the case).
164. 710 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied before judgment, 2013 WL
3789507 (Oct. 2013).
165. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1095-99.
166. Id. at 1089-90 (majority opinion).
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. See supra Part III.B.
169. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1090.
170. Id at 1097.
171. Id. at 1092-93 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793, n. 14
(1983)). See also Newdow v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 265, 285 n. 23 (D.D.C. 2005)
(noting that "the legislative prayers at the U.S. Congress are overtly sectarian");

Brief of Members of Congress Amicus Curiae, supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
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The Rubin court also found the policy constitutional in effect.172
In contrast to the majority in Joyner, the court in Rubin found the
preponderance of Christian references insignificant because it was
simply a product of "demographics," beyond the reach of the judicial
system's control.173 Likewise, the court found that the execution of a
neutral government policy does not advance one religion over another. 174
Rather, it remains an element of private choice where the Supreme Court
has deferred judgment.' 75
Thus, the recent additions of Atheists ofFlorida,Inc., and Rubin
add a new layer of analysis onto Pelphrey and create a strong alternative
to the "policy in practice" approach. However, these circuits seem to
give the most deference to neutral prayer policies. Therefore, even if the
results in the deferential circuits are applied to Lund, Rowan County's
sectarian prayers were informal, making the result less certain. However,
as Parts IV and V will show, if appropriate deference is given to Marsh
itself, a broad category of sectarian prayer, formal or informal, is still
permitted.
IV. LuND v. ROWAN COUNTY
In January of 2012, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review the Fourth Circuit's decision in Joyner.
Since this decision,
172. See Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097-98.
173. Id. at 1099. To this point Judge O'Scannlain analogized the government's
Establishment Clause liability in legislative prayer with their liability in the schoolvoucher setting. Id. See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 546 U.S. 639 (2002)
(holding that a state's choice to fund education through a neutral voucher program
did not violate the establishment clause even though 96% of the funds were
distributed to parochial schools). Applying Zelman to the legislative prayer setting,
the court drew the same conclusion, that "when a neutral government policy or
program merely allows or enables private religious acts, those acts do not necessarily
bear the state's imprimatur." Rubin, 710 F.3d. at 1099.
174. See Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097-98.
175. See id. at 1099. The majority further found that just as it cannot guarantee
complete diversity in prayer invitations, "[n]or can it compel leaders of those
congregations to accept its invitations." Id.
176. Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012) (holding that Forsyth County's use of sectarian
prayer at county meetings violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
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North Carolina has become fertile ground for liberal interest group
challenges to municipal prayer practices.
Indeed, more than twenty
municipalities were contacted by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") regarding their compliance with the Fourth Circuit's holding
in Joyner. Rowan County was among those counties contacted by the
ACLU and received a "cease and desist" letter, asking that its
commissioners stop the use of "unconstitutional sectarian prayer," at
commission meetings. 179 Rowan County, unlike many of its neighboring
communities,'s had maintained no formal policy but did conduct
informal prayers at county meetings for decades without substantive
guidelines.
In its letter, the ACLU noted they had "received more
complaints about sectarian legislative prayer by the Rowan County
Board of Commissioners than any other local government in North
Carolina in the past several years."1 82 Rowan County declined to
formally respond to the ACLU letter, but its antipathy for the merits of
the claim became increasingly public.184 In spite of the threat of
177. See Joe Depriest & Adam Bell, supra note 20.
178. See Karissa Minn, ACLU Asks Commissioners to Stop Opening Meetings
With
Prayer, SALISBURY
POST
(Feb.
16,
2012,
12:01
AM),
http://www.salisburypost.com/News/021612-ACLU-contacts-county-about-prayerqcd.
179. Id.
180. See Depriest & Bell, supra note 20 and accompanying text. Cf Galloway
U.S. _, 133 S.
v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted,_
Ct. 2388 (2013). Like Rowan County, the Town of Greece maintained no formal
prayer policy before the town's practice was challenged by local citizens. Town of
Greece, 681 F.3d at 22.
181. Rowan County does not have a formal prayer policy, and the facts are still
in dispute as to how long sectarian prayers may or may not have been offered at
commission meetings. The plaintiffs complaint alleges that sectarian prayers have
been offered since "November 2007." Verified Complaint For Declaratory And
Injunctive Relief And Nominal Damages at 2, Lund v. Rowan County, North
available at
(1:13
cv-00207-JAB-JLW),
Carolina
(Mar.
12,
2013)
https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/lund-et-al-v-rowan-county-complaint
[hereinafter Lund Complaint].
182. Minn, supra note 178.
183. Id.
184. Lund Complaint, supra note 181, at 10. In the days following receipt of
the ACLU letter, the combative comments by Commissioner Jim Sides were made
public: "I will continue to pray in JESUS name" and "I volunteer to be the first to
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litigation and the chilling effect seen among neighboring
municipalities,'
sectarian prayer continued at subsequent Rowan
County commission meetings until the ACLU, on behalf of three Rowan
County residents, filed suit to enjoin Rowan County's Commissioners
from continuing their prayer practice on March 12, 2013.186
The plaintiffs brought their complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983,
challenging "the constitutionality of the sectarian prayer practice in
Rowan County."' The plaintiffs' central allegation asserts that "[s]ince
November 2007, 97% of all Board meetings have featured expressly
Christian prayer" and that these prayers have "promoted divisiveness"
within meetings. 88 To bolster this allegation, the plaintiffs included
thirteen separate anecdotal references to sectarian prayers given during
meetings from 2007 to 2013.1 Among the sectarian invocations, some
of the more colorful allegations include:
We can't be defeated, we can't be destroyed, and
we can't be denied because we are going to live
forever with you through the salvation of Jesus
Christ. Lord be with us today and provide us with
your supreme guidance and wisdom as we conduct
the business of Rowan County. And, as we pick up
the Cross, we will proclaim His name above all
go to jail for this cause . . . and if you will go [sic] my bail in time for the next
meeting, I will go again!" Id. at 11.
185. See Depriest & Bell, supra note 20. In 2011, the Kannapolis City Council
abandoned its use of sectarian prayer after a Wisconsin non-profit called the
Freedom From Religion Foundation cautioned use of sectarian prayers. Id. In 2013,
Union, Lincoln, and Iredell Counties all heeded similar warnings. Id.
186. See Lund Complaint, supra note 181, at 13-18.
187. Id. at 2, 13. Plaintiffs also allege that Rowan County has violated Article
1, §13 and Article 19 of North Carolina's Constitution, interpreted to "require
religious neutrality." Id. at 13.
188. Id. at 2, 11.
189. Id. at 8. Rowan County formally denied the allegation that 97% of
commission meetings were opened with sectarian prayer. Rowan County was
"without knowledge sufficient to form a belief' as to merits of the descriptive list of
sectarian prayers in allegations 25-27. Both responses are codified in their answer to
the court. See Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint For Declaratory And
Injunctive Relief And Nominal Damages at 1-4, Lund v. Rowan County (No. 1:13cv-207-JAB-JLW) (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Rowan County Answer].
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names, as the only way to eternal life. I ask this in
the name of the King of Kings, the Lord of Lords,
Jesus Christ.' 90
The plaintiffs found the prayers inappropriate for differing
reasonsl91 and sought declaratory relief as well as a preliminary
injunction to prevent Rowan County from "knowingly and/or
intentionally delivering or allowing to be delivered sectarian prayers at
meetings of the Rowan County Board of Commissioners."' 92 In response,
Rowan County filed a motion to dismiss in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.19 3 The county argued
that dismissal was proper on three independent grounds: the plaintiffs
lacked standing, the court did not have sufficient guidelines to determine
a "sectarian prayer," and Rowan County held no vicarious liability for
prayers given by commissioners.194 The District Court dismissed each
argument in turn under current Fourth Circuit precedent.' 9 5

A. Standing
Rowan County argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege a
"concrete or particularized" injury because as citizen participants in
county meetings, they were not required to participate in prayers, nor
were they "excluded from participation . . . subjected to harassing,

taunting or otherwise humiliating actions." 9' 6 The court held that in
Establishment Clause cases the actual harm necessary for standing arises

190. See Lund Complaint, supra note 181, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
191. Id. at 3-4. Two plaintiffs agreed that the prayer practice has the effect of
affiliating "the County with one particular faith" while another felt excluded in the
meetings. Id.
192. Id. at 13.
193. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 26. In the alternative to the
motion to dismiss, Rowan County also filed a motion to stay the proceedings,
pending resolution of Town of Greece v. Galloway in the Supreme Court. Id. at 27.
This motion was denied and the court found "no reason to ignore the current state of
the law." Id.
194. Id. at 8.
195. See id. at 1-28.
196. Id. at 11 (quoting from the Defendant's Brief In Support of Motion to
Dismiss, at 31).

2014]

UNANSWERED PRAYERS

655

out of the "unwelcome direct contact with a religious display that
appears to be endorsed by the state." 9 Therefore, because plaintiffs
were citizens of Rowan County, with a record of attending meetings, and
were expected to continue attending meetings where unwelcome
religious statements were consistently made, standing was satisfied.9
B. PoliticalQuestion

Rowan County also argued that the court could not "formulate a
definition" capable of truly demarcating between sectarian and nonsectarian prayer.199 As such, the plaintiffs claim presented a nonjusticiable political question, for which the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. 200 However, the court found that the sectarian nature and
permissibility of legislative prayers, policies, or customs was fairly
determinable through case law in the Fourth Circuit and that subject201
matter jurisdiction was proper.
C. Vicarious Liability
Rowan County further argued that a municipality carries no
vicarious liability for 42 U.S.C. §1983 violations under the holding of
202
Monell v. Department of Social Services and that any sectarian prayers
offered by county commissioners were given as private citizens, not as
203
government actors.
Under Monell, a plaintiff can attach vicarious

197. Id. (quoting Suhre v. Haywood Cnty. 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir.
1997)).
198.
199.
200.
201.

U.S.

Id. at 13-16.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14; see Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 349, cert. denied,

, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (describing that "legislative prayer must strive

to be nondenominational" and "infrequent references to deities, standing alone, do
not suffice to make out a constitutional claim"); see also Wynne v. Town of Great
Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (discriminating between a prayer that "invoked a deity
whose divinity only those of the faith believe" and "without 'explicit references'. . .
to Jesus Christ, or the patron saint.") (internal quotations omitted).
202. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
203. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 17 (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691-92).
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liability to a municipality if the plaintiff establishes that his injury was
"proximately caused by a written policy ordinance, or by a widespread
practice that is 'so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom
or usage' with the force of law."204 Here, the plaintiffs alleged that no
formal policy existed and the County operated under the informal
tradition of "rotating through the Commissioners to offer a prayer" and
that "whether to pray, and what to pray, is made by the individual
commissioners not Rowan County." 2 05 The court found that the prayers
delivered government speech rather than private speech because they
occurred in a "local government meeting" where "government business
is discussed and where the Commissioners pray in support of that
business.,206

Following the district court's award of a preliminary injunction
to the plaintiff, Rowan County formally responded to the court with its
answer.207 Judge Beaty's treatment of Rowan County's motion to dismiss
was squarely in line with Fourth Circuit precedent post-Joyner.
However, Galloway provides the Supreme Court an opportunity to
examine the entire body of the Marsh doctrine as it has developed over
thirty years and determine if the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Marsh
is the right one, a subject I take up below.
V. ROWAN COUNTY'S INFORMAL SECTARIAN PRAYERS Do NOT
VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNDER MARSH

When the United States Supreme Court made the policy choice
to allow prayer in front of deliberative bodies, it also implicitly chose to
entertain all of the human foibles and frailties that prayer in a public
forum elicits. In the abstract of course, prayer-givers would temper their
words reasonably, harmless prayers would be easily delineated from
harmful ones, and all religious viewpoints would be represented equally.
Intuitively, human nature tells us this result cannot be achieved in theory,
much less in practice. Indeed, prayer is perhaps the most intimate and
spiritual moment of personal reflection a human being can articulate,
204. Id. at 17-18 (citing City of St. Louis v. Prapronik, 485 U.S. 112, 127).
205. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 18.
206. Id. at 19 (citing Turner, Doe, and Joyner, where Council members were
found to be government rather than private actors).
207. See Rowan County Answer, supra note 189.
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saddled with centuries of religious strife, tempered in some more than in
others. Moreover, the content of prayers reflect the historical and cultural
experiences of the community where the prayer is offered, a viewpoint
that may, or may not, be religiously or socio-economically diverse.
Furthermore, even sensible prayer-givers, engulfed with emotion, may
not always instinctively know if or when their prayer has crossed a
judicially imposed line of permissiveness. These normative factors did
not go unnoticed by the Marsh Court.20
To manage the realities of legislative prayer, the Court chose to
place very few substantive restrictions on the content of a legislative
prayer-giver's speech and stripped a judge's power to engage in
"comparative theology."209 Ultimately, the Roberts Court will appraise
the wisdom of this decision. Until then, legislative prayer policy "begins
and ends" 2 10 with Marsh.
As such, the "deferential" approach adopted in the Eleventh and
Ninth Circuit Courts rather than the "policy in practice" approach is most
consonant with the spirit of Marsh for four reasons: (1) the history and
context of legislative prayer demands judicial deference; (2) incidental
advancement of religion does not exploit the prayer opportunity; (3)
Marsh prohibits proselytization, not evangelism, a necessary distinction
to be made within the doctrine, and (4) mere sectarian prayers, without
more, prohibit a court from "parsing" the content of individual prayers.
As Part V will demonstrate, without further clarity on the substance of
legislative prayers directly from the Supreme Court, the prayers in
Rowan County, however colorful or unapologetically sectarian in nature,
still do not violate the Establishment Clause under Marsh.

208. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 819-21 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing the policy implications of allowing prayer in front of
legislatures and denoting the Court's institutional incompetence to regulate
"religious life").
209. See Brett B. Harvey & David A. Cortman, An Open Letter to Interested
PartiesRegarding the Legality of Public Invocations, Alliance Defending Freedom
(May 1, 2013), at 9, availableat http://www.adfmedia.org/files/
OpenLetterPubliclnvocations.pdf (coining as "comparative theology" the type of
speech analyzed in Pelphrey).
210. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Town of Greece v. Galloway,
U.S.
, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013) (No.12-696), 2013 WL 5939896, at *14.
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A. The History and Context of Marsh DemandJudicialDeference
The Supreme Court has repeated many times that "we are a
religious people and our institutions presuppose a higher being." 2 11
Marsh re-enforces this idea. Legislatures at all levels of American
government continue a 200-year-old tradition vetted by the draftsmen of
the Constitution and affirmed by a majority of the Supreme Court just a
212
generation ago.
This tradition bolsters not only "legislative prayer
generally but . . . sectarian legislative prayer specifically." 2 13 Since
1983, legislative prayer has been distinguished from the placement of a
religious creche in Allegheny, as well as the prayers offered at a
graduation ceremony in Lee. Likewise, Lee acknowledged the audience
for legislative prayers, presumably adult citizens, were not susceptible to
"coercion," or religious indoctrination in the same manner as primary
214
school children.
Had the Supreme Court taken the opportunity to
equate those intersections of church and state with Marsh, the uniqueness
215
of legislative prayer would be significantly diminished.
The Court
declined such an opportunity.
In light of this "unique" history, the Snyder court presumed the
legitimacy of all legislative prayers, labeling them sui generis.216
Although the "deferential approach" circuits have retreated from
Snyder's presumption, they have upheld sectarian references offered as
211
part of neutral legislative prayer-policies.
Unlike those sectarian
211. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); see also Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) ("Neither government nor this Court can or should
ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and
worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive
historically from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance
of the existence of religion . . . .") (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 306 (2002) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
212. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
213. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013)
(emphasis in original).
214. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992).
215. See id. at 596-97.
216. See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1231-33 (10th Cir.
1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1039 (1999); see also supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
217. See supra Part Il.B.
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prayers, the sectarian prayers in Lund were offered by County
Commissioners, not local citizens and were not part of a formal neutral
.218
policy.
However, this distinction should not be dispositive, given that
the substance of the message and the practical effects of the prayers
offered in Rowan County mirror comparable prayers upheld in the
"deferential" approach circuits. For example, in Rubin a contested prayer
ended with the statement: "Bring our minds to know you and in the
precious, holy and righteous and matchless name of Jesus I pray this
prayer. Amen and Amen. God bless you." 2 19 Also like Rubin, no prayergiver in Rowan County was denied an opportunity to pray and a
predominately Christian message was disseminated over time.220
Therefore, even if Snyder overreaches, and Marsh does not create a
presumption of validity, the reasoned deference to legislative prayer as a
category, utilized in the "deferential" approach, provides the most
sensible starting point for the Marsh inquiry.
B. IncidentalAdvancement ofReligion Does Not Exploit the Prayer
Opportunity
Even without a presumption of validity, the sectarian prayers in
Lund should still be permitted because the prayer opportunity was not
exploited. Without exploitation of the prayer opportunity, legislative
prayer, sectarian or otherwise, cannot trigger Establishment Clause
liability.221 A prayer opportunity is exploited only if it stems from an
"impermissible motive" or as Marsh framed it, "proselytize[s] or
advance[s] any one, or . . . [d]isparage[s] any other, faith or belief."2 22
However, there is no judicial consensus on what exactly constitutes
"advancement" or "proselytizing" behavior.
Notwithstanding proselytization, the Fourth Circuit construes
"proselytize" and "advance" as disjunctive verbs, meaning that
advancement of religion alone could exploit the prayer opportunity.223
218. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 24, at 2-8.
219. See Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1090.

220. Id. at 8-10.
221. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95 (1983).
222. Id. at 794-95.
223. See supra Part III.A; see also supra notes 96-99.
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Under this approach, advancement is interpreted broadly, including any
prayers that "forward, further, [or] promote' the belief." 22 4 Similar to the
Fourth Circuit approach, the Second Circuit adopts the "advancement"
approach but through the alternative lens of "endorsement." 22 5 I
contrast, the Rubin Court concluded that mere advancement of religion,
without more, cannot violate the prayer opportunity because it sets an
unrealistic threshold to judge legislative prayer under Marsh.226
The history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence supports Rubin's analysis and indicates Marsh was not
designed to prevent mere advancement of religion.227 Indeed, "all prayers
'advance' a particular faith or belief in one way or another." 228 Had the
Supreme Court wanted to dispose of legislative prayer in this manner, as
it did silent school prayer229 immediately after Marsh, the first two
prongs of the Lemon test would have easily accomplished the task.230 The
Court declined this opportunity. Therefore, because the Supreme Court
abandoned the Lemon test in Marsh, and the more recent "endorsement
test" is in essence a collapsed version of the Lemon test, Marsh must be
viewed as permitting a broader category of legislative prayer than the
"policy in practice" approach has prescribed.231

224. See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (2004).
225. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2013) ("We
conclude ... that the town's prayer practice must be viewed as an endorsement of a
particular religious viewpoint. This conclusion is supported by several
considerations, including the prayer-giver selection process, the content of the
prayers, and the contextual action (and inactions) of prayer-givers and town
officials.").
226. See Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097.
227. Id.
228. Snyderv. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10thCir. 1998).
229. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (applying the Lemon test and
striking down silent prayer in public schools).
230. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1097.
231. Id.
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C. Marsh's ProselytizationProng is an UncertainStandard
1. Marsh Should Prohibit Prayers that Proselytize not Evangelize
The primary purpose of Marsh was to prevent "a more
aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization"2 32 which is not
233
present in Lund. Admittedly, Marsh did not provide a formal definition
for "proselytize," nor did it include anecdotal guidance for lower courts
to conclusively characterize proselytizing behavior. In fact, "[The
Supreme Court has] never defined the term 'proselytize,' much less
provided any workable legal test for determining precisely what qualifies
as prohibited proselytizing.',234 Since Marsh, the Wynne and Snyder
courts have agreed on the dictionary definition: an action "to convert
from one religion, belief, opinion, or party to another."2 35 But, while
"[d]ictionaries can be useful aids .

.

. they are no substitute for a close

analysis of what words mean," 236 and an appellate court could provide
clearer guidelines to prayer-givers by distinguishing "proselytization"
from "evangelism." A recent interpretation of the U.S. Military, another
area of the government with its own well-documented church and state
237
238
issues, draws such a distinction.
.

232. Snyder, 159 F.3d at 1234 n.10.
233. See supra Part IV (explaining the context of the prayers offered by
Rowan County); see also infra Part IV.C.1 (arguing that Lund's sectarian prayers
lack the character of the prayers held to proselythize in Snyder).
234. See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of
Religious Endorsements, supra note 10 at 1010, n. 179 (quoting Christian M. Keiner,
Preachingfrom the State's Podium: What Speech Is Proselytizing Prohibitedby the
Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83, 85 (2007)).
235. Id. (quoting 3 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED)

(1986)); see also id. at 1234 ("[T]he kind of legislative prayer that will run afoul of
the Constitution is one that proselytizes a particular religious tenet or belief, or that
aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or that derogates another religious
faith or doctrine.").
236. See MCI Telecommuns. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 240
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of
Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REv.
89 (2007) (explaining the history and First Amendment constitutional issues that
military chaplaincies face).
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On May 2, 2013, the Department of Defense submitted a press
release titled "Statement on Religious Proselytizing," that described the
Department's opinion of what constituted proselytizing behavior:
"Service members can share their faith (evangelize), but must not force
unwanted, intrusive attempts to convert others of any faith or no faith to
one's beliefs (proselytization).' 2 39 When the U.S. Military interpretation
is applied to Lund and compared with Snyder, as the facts are laid out
below, it becomes clear that the Rowan County Commission's sectarian
references fall closer to evangelism, or "sharing one's faith," 24 0 rather
than outright proselytization, an intrusive attempt to convert listeners to a
particular belief.241
Snyder correctly illustrates the type of behavior Marsh was
designed to limit. In Snyder, a local citizen's prayer was considered to
''proselytize" when the prayer called all legislative prayers
"hypocritical," "blasphemous," "evil," "mis-guided," and sought support
for abolition of the entire prayer forum.242 Unlike the speaker in Snyder,
the prayers in Lund were evangelical in nature because they praised
specific tenets of the Christian faith, such as "the Cross at Calvary," and
the "King of Kings," 243 but without seeking to exclude or disparage other
religious beliefs.244 To be sure, many of the prayers in Lund did allude to
the supremacy of Jesus Christ, and the glorification of his message to the
world.245 Likewise, the unapologetic public statements and recital of the
Lord's Prayer by Commissioner Sides could be construed as overt
symbolism of Christianity. However, both statements were made in
response to a news report, after the complaint was filed, intended as a

238. See United States Central Command General Order IB (Mar. 13, 2006),
available at http://www.militaryatheists.org/regs/JPGOlB-4.pdf (Part 2 of General
Order lB enumerates "prohibited activities" of military personnel and lists
"[p]roselytizing of any religion, faith or practice.").
239. See also Warren Throckmoron, Is the Military Preparing to Court
Marshal Christians?,PATHEOS (May 2, 2013), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/
warrenthrockmorton/2013/05/02/is-the-military-preparing-to-court-marshalchristians/.
240. Id.
241. See id
242. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998).

243. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 9 (emphasis omitted).
244. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 8-10.
245. Id.
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protest of the Middle District's preliminary injunction.246 Therefore,
these statements may be persuasive in the court of public opinion, but
they should not play a role in the factual record of the case. More
importantly, all prayers offered by the Commission lacked the animus of
247
the speakers in both Wynne and Snyder, and were offered for an
evangelical purpose, the emotional and spiritual guidance of the
Commission, not to combat dissenting religious opinion.
2. Future Utility of the Proselytization Prong
Legal scholars have also questioned the future utility of Marsh's
248
proselytization prong.
Professor Christopher Lund posits two
alternative courses for the future of legislative prayer. The first option
takes the form of a sectarian balancing test. As Professor Lund puts it,
the "proselytizing test . . . could become a variant of the non-sectarian
standard . . . requiring that a certain percentage of prayers be sectarian

before the process as a whole is considered proselytizing." 2 49 Under a
balancing approach, the relative sectarian weight of a prayer would be
measured on an objective spectrum, in part by the demographic
composition of the locality.250 Therefore, the fact that ninety-seven
percent of the prayers in Lund were alleged to be sectarian251 would have
to be fully reconciled with the fact that a majority of Rowan County
122
citizens adhere to some variant of Christianity.
Furthermore, two
courts have indicated their willingness to side-step this consideration
altogether. Both Rubin and the Joyner dissent held the frequency of
sectarian prayers were unimportant because it was "simply the product of
demographics,"253 a social function beyond the control of the legal
system.

246. Id.
247. See Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2004).
248. See Lund, supra note 10.
249. Id. at 1011.
250. Id. at 1011-12.
251. See Memorandum Opinion, supra note 32, at 2.
252. Rowan County, North Carolina (NC), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.citydata.com/county/Rowan County-NC.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
253. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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Alternatively, the proselytization prong "could simply become a
way that courts get out of the business of reviewing legislative
prayers. 2 54 This conclusion also bodes well for Rowan County because
"[i]f past cases are any guide the proselytizing language of Marsh would
likely lead to almost complete judicial deference for state and local
,255
governments." Increased deference to local governments, whose actors
are closest to the pulse of their communities, would validate both the
prayers in Joyner and Lund, where a predominately Christian message
was disseminated, but to a predominately Christian community. Local
government actors subject to popular election would also be more
accountable to their populous than an unelected judicial body. This
solution, however, rests on an equally shaky constitutional footing, given
the "general premise that the government's religion should be decided by
a majority vote contradicts the most basic of the Court's Religion Clause
principles." 256
Thus, the history of the Establishment Clause shows that
incidental advancement of religion from sectarian prayer sets an
unrealistic bar for municipalities to facilitate prayer. Likewise, there is
significant ambiguity in the meaning of the word proselytize, as well as
the limits the Marsh Court sought to impose on its usage. Thus, as Part
V.D shows, in the legislative prayer setting, judges should avoid the
temptation to "parse" the substance of individual prayers.
D. Mere SectarianPrayer, Without More, Prohibitsa Courtfrom
"Parsing"the Content ofIndividual Prayers
Marsh plainly mandates that judges are not to "parse" the
content of legislative prayers.257 The "deferential" circuits have heeded
the command, and the "policy in practice" circuits have not.258 The latter
260
259
read Marsh's footnote 14, along with Allegheny, to permit a closer

254. See Lund, supra note 10, at 1011.

255. Id.
256. Id. at 1020-21.
257. Marsh v. Chambers, 710 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983).
258. Cf supra Parts lIl.A., I1I.B.
259. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14 (The court describes how "Palmer
characterizes his prayers as 'nonsectarian,' 'Judeo Christian,' and with 'elements of
the American civil religion.' Although some of his earlier prayers were often
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scrutiny of sectarian prayer.261 However, the Rubin court reached the
opposite conclusion. Rubin interpreted Marsh to have affirmed all the
prayers offered in Nebraska's legislative prayer history, not just the nonsectarian prayers offered after 1980.262 In fact, Nebraska's history was
263
replete with sectarian prayer, as is the current United States Congress.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has drawn no affirmative distinction
between prayers offered in front of state legislatures and municipalitiess
and Lee, although untested in legislative prayer cases, rebuts Simpson
and teaches that prayers cannot be censored to reach a government "nonsectarian" ideal.265
Even if an appellate court could act as a "board of censors, 266
the value of such a process would be futile because "any practice of
legislative prayer, even if it might look 'non-sectarian' to nine Justices of
the Supreme Court, will inevitably and continuously involve the state in
one or another religious debate."267 Therefore, at a minimum, Marsh and
Allegheny do not conclusively prohibit sectarian prayer, and Lund's
sectarian prayers did not seek to convert their audience of listeners. As
such, any further inquiry should be forestalled, and the substance of the
prayers should not be "parsed" to determine their self-worth.

explicitly Christian, Palmer removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint
from a Jewish legislator.") (internal citations omitted).
260. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
603 (1989) ("[N]ot even the 'unique history' of legislative prayer can justify
contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government
with any one specific faith or belief. The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did
not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had 'removed all references
to Christ."') (internal citations omitted).
261. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d. 1087, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2013).
262. Id. at 1093-94.
263. See id.; see also Brief for Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae,supra
note 67 and accompanying text.
264. Justice Kennedy alluded to this point in the Town of Greece oral
argument, stating: "In a way it sounds quite elitist to say, well, now, we can do this
in Washington and Sacramento and Austin, Texas, but you people up there in Greece
can't do that." Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Town of Greece v. Galloway,
U.S. _,
133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896, at *55.
265. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578-79 (1992).
266. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is a canon of First Amendment jurisprudence that "[s]ound
approaches to the state's treatment of religion cannot be collapsed into
any single formula." 2 6 8 Parts I and II re-affirm this general theory and
demonstrate how the special rules for legislative prayer fit into the
broader First Amendment puzzle. However, as the circuit split in Part III
shows, if legislative prayer is to endure at the local level in the twentyfirst century, municipalities, like Rowan County, need enhanced
substantive guidance to inform local prayer policy or, in the alternative,
affirmation that Marsh is no longer the primary guiding principle. In the
absence of a contemporary reboot, the factual background illustrated by
Lund in Part IV and analyzed in Part V shows that a correct application
of Marsh is still sufficient to resolve, even extreme, sectarian legislative
prayer issues. However, given the evangelical nature of the human spirit,
the result will too often elicit close judgment calls and invite continued
judicial intervention. Therefore, the Roberts Court must face the same
difficult policy choice that the Marsh Court faced in 1983, this time
against the backdrop of a shifting religious paradigm.269 The Supreme
Court's judgment will go a long way in appraising the current state of the
Establishment Clause in 2014.

268. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS 1 (2006).

269. See supra Parts III.A. & III.B.

